On August 6, 2026, Energy-Storage.news published an interview with Jerome Bersano — former Head of BESS Product at Northvolt and co-founder of newly launched Enexya — warning that the European Union's emerging restrictions on Chinese inverter and power conversion system (PCS) imports could be "a sign of things to come" for the broader battery energy storage system (BESS) market. Bersano, who left Northvolt following its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in March 2025, brings a rare dual perspective: as a former executive at Europe's most ambitious (and ultimately failed) battery manufacturing venture, and now as the co-founder of a BESS integrator whose shareholders include China's Zetatech and France's Sirea. His central thesis is nuanced: the EU is unlikely to restrict lithium-ion cell imports from China — which dominates over 80% of global LFP cell production — but will almost certainly use trade policy to reserve BESS system integration and local manufacturing for European firms. For energy professionals evaluating TUV CE IEC certified inverter options, the evolving EU policy landscape has direct implications for procurement strategy, supply chain resilience, and total cost of ownership.
Overview of the Technology / News
The EU's inverter restrictions did not emerge in isolation. They are part of a broader package of trade defense measures that the European Commission has been progressively constructing since the 2022 energy crisis exposed Europe's deep dependence on Chinese clean energy supply chains. The key legislative instruments include: (1) the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), adopted in June 2024, which mandates that by 2030 at least 40% of the EU's annual deployment needs for strategic net-zero technologies — including battery storage and solar PV inverters — must be manufactured within the EU; (2) the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), effective July 2023, which empowers the Commission to investigate and block procurements where non-EU government subsidies give bidders an unfair advantage — already used to investigate Chinese solar panel and wind turbine bids in Romania and France; and (3) the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in March 2024, which sets targets for domestic extraction (10%), processing (40%), and recycling (25%) of strategic raw materials including lithium, cobalt, and natural graphite by 2030.
Bersano's specific warning focuses on inverter/PCS — the power electronics that convert DC from batteries to grid-synchronous AC. Inverters are strategically distinct from cells: while cell manufacturing requires massive capital expenditure (US$500 million-1 billion per GWh of annual production capacity) and complex electrochemistry expertise, inverter manufacturing is fundamentally an assembly and power electronics operation — capital expenditure per MW of annual production capacity is roughly US$10-20 million, one to two orders of magnitude less than cell manufacturing. This makes inverter localization a more achievable policy goal for the EU: a 10 GW/year inverter factory would cost approximately US$200-400 million in CAPEX, compared to US$5-10 billion for an equivalent cell factory. Bersano's Enexya has already launched C&I and utility-scale BESS products that use Zetatech's manufacturing capabilities (likely in China) combined with Sirea's French power electronics expertise — a cross-border supply chain model that the EU's emerging trade policy may make increasingly difficult to sustain.
Why This Development Matters
Bersano's warning matters for three structural reasons that collectively signal a fundamental shift in how the global energy storage supply chain will be organized by 2030. First, the inverter is the strategic chokepoint in a BESS. While lithium-ion cells account for approximately 50-60% of a utility-scale BESS system cost, the inverter/PCS is the critical software-defined component that determines grid compliance, ancillary service capability, and revenue optimization. A BESS using the same cells but different inverter firmware can have dramatically different revenue profiles in wholesale markets — a grid-forming inverter (capable of providing synthetic inertia and black-start) can earn 2-3× the ancillary service revenue of a grid-following inverter in markets like the UK's Dynamic Containment or Australia's FCAS. By localizing inverter manufacturing, the EU is effectively retaining control over the highest-value software and systems integration layer of the BESS value chain — a strategic move that mirrors China's own industrial policy of retaining domestic control over high-value-added manufacturing while importing commodity raw materials.
Second, the policy trajectory is clear and accelerating. The EU's anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EV imports — which resulted in countervailing duties of 17.4-38.1% on Chinese-made EVs in October 2024 — established the legal and political precedent for extending trade measures to other clean energy products. Solar PV modules have been subject to EU trade measures (anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties) since 2013, though these were allowed to expire in 2018 amid political pushback from member states with large solar deployment targets. BESS — as the newest and fastest-growing segment of the clean energy supply chain — is the logical next target for trade policy intervention, particularly given the EU's goal of installing 200 GW of energy storage by 2030 (up from approximately 50 GW at end-2025). If even 50% of this deployment uses locally manufactured inverters and BESS enclosures, it represents a €30-50 billion addressable market for European manufacturers over the next five years.
Third, the US parallel provides a roadmap. The US Inflation Reduction Act's Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit — which provides up to US$35/kWh for battery cell manufacturing and US$10/kWh for battery module manufacturing in the US — has already triggered over US$140 billion in announced battery and BESS manufacturing investments since August 2022. Crucially, the IRA also includes domestic content requirements for the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for energy storage projects: starting in 2026, projects must use 40% US-manufactured components (by cost) to qualify for the full 30% ITC, rising to 55% by 2027. The result has been a rapid build-out of US-based BESS enclosure and integration facilities — Fluence (Utah), Powin (Oregon), and Wärtsilä (Texas) all operate US-based BESS integration lines — even as cells continue to be imported primarily from China and South Korea. The EU is likely to follow a structurally similar path: restrict system integration and power electronics, but maintain open trade in commodity cells.
Technical Deep Dive
The inverter/PCS localization strategy operates on three technical layers that together determine the competitive landscape for BESS integrators.
Layer 1: Power semiconductor supply chain. The core components of a utility-scale BESS inverter — IGBT (insulated-gate bipolar transistor) modules or SiC (silicon carbide) MOSFETs — are manufactured by a concentrated global supply base: Infineon (Germany), STMicroelectronics (Switzerland/France/Italy), ON Semiconductor (US), and Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) for IGBTs; Wolfspeed (US), STMicroelectronics, and ROHM (Japan) for SiC. Notably, China does not have a significant presence in the high-power IGBT/SiC market (Chinese manufacturers like CRRC Times Electric and StarPower primarily serve domestic rail and EV applications, and lack the reliability track record for utility-scale grid-connected inverters). This means that EU-based BESS integrators have a natural supply chain advantage: they can source power semiconductors from Infineon and STMicroelectronics without crossing a China-related trade barrier, while Chinese BESS integrators must import the same semiconductors (or use domestically produced alternatives with inferior reliability data) to manufacture inverters that the EU may then restrict. For those researching solar inverter efficiency comparison, the semiconductor supply chain is the hidden variable that explains why inverter localization is more achievable than cell localization.
Layer 2: Grid code compliance and certification. Every inverter connected to a European grid must comply with the EU Network Code on Requirements for Grid Connection of Generators (NC RfG, EU Regulation 2016/631) and, for BESS specifically, with the emerging Network Code on Demand Response and Energy Storage (expected to enter force in 2027-2028). These codes specify voltage ride-through, frequency response, reactive power capability, and fault current contribution requirements that must be demonstrated through certification by an accredited test laboratory — typically DNV GL, TÜV SÜD, or DEKRA in Europe. Certification testing for a new inverter platform costs approximately €500,000-1 million and takes 12-18 months, creating a significant barrier to entry for non-European manufacturers. Bersano's Enexya — with Sirea's existing EU grid code certifications and Zetatech's manufacturing cost structure — is positioned precisely at the intersection of this regulatory arbitrage opportunity. For those evaluating grid-tied inverter anti-islanding protection for their projects, EU certification requirements are becoming stricter, not more lenient.
Layer 3: Software and grid services. The inverter firmware — the control algorithms that determine how the BESS responds to grid frequency deviations, voltage sags, and dispatch signals — is where the highest value is captured. A BESS inverter with advanced grid-forming firmware (providing synthetic inertia, black-start capability, and islanded operation) can command a 20-40% price premium over a basic grid-following inverter. The EU's policy of localizing inverter manufacturing is effectively a policy of retaining control over this firmware layer — and, by extension, over the data streams (real-time grid measurements, dispatch signals, market prices) that flow through the inverter's communication interfaces. In an era where BESS revenue optimization is increasingly driven by AI/ML-based dispatch algorithms (Autobidder, Habitat Energy, etc.), control over inverter firmware is control over the most valuable IP in the BESS value chain. This also relates to hybrid inverter vs on-grid inverter: the distinction between hybrid and on-grid topologies is fundamentally a software and control architecture question, and EU-localized inverter development will accelerate innovation in both categories.
Real-world Applications
The EU inverter localization push has immediate, practical implications for three categories of BESS stakeholders. For project developers: the key question is whether EU-manufactured inverters can match Chinese inverters on price and delivery timeline. Sungrow and Huawei — the two dominant Chinese BESS inverter/PCS suppliers, with a combined global market share of approximately 40-45% in utility-scale BESS PCS — offer PCS at approximately US$35-50/kW (for a 2-4 hour system) with delivery lead times of 8-12 weeks from order to delivery. EU-based PCS manufacturers (SMA, Ingeteam, Power Electronics) currently offer PCS at US$55-80/kW with lead times of 16-24 weeks — a 40-60% price premium and 2× lead time. The NZIA's 40% local content target will effectively mandate EU PCS for a significant share of the market, meaning developers must factor higher PCS costs and longer lead times into their project economics and construction schedules.
For BESS integrators: the localization push creates both risk and opportunity. Established EU integrators — Fluence (with its German engineering center and Erlangen manufacturing), Nidec ASI (Italy), and Saft (France) — are well-positioned to benefit from local content requirements, as they already have EU-based manufacturing and supply chains. New entrants like Bersano's Enexya face a steeper climb: establishing EU-based inverter manufacturing from scratch requires US$50-100 million in CAPEX and 2-3 years of lead time, during which Chinese competitors may capture market share in non-EU markets (UK, Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia) where no localization restrictions apply.
For end users evaluating energy storage inverter compatibility, the policy environment adds complexity to procurement decisions. A BESS system with an EU-manufactured inverter and Chinese-manufactured cells — the likely "hybrid" configuration that will dominate the European market by 2028-2030 — requires careful evaluation of warranty coverage (which party is responsible if the inverter fails? the cell supplier? the integrator?), spare parts availability (can the developer source replacement inverter components during the 20-year project life?), and certification continuity (does the EU inverter certification remain valid if the system is reconfigured with different cells?).
Industry Impact / Market Implications
The EU inverter localization push is part of a global pattern of "clean energy supply chain nationalism" that is reshaping the economics of energy storage. The US IRA, India's Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) battery manufacturing (₹18,100 crore, approximately US$2.2 billion, allocated across three beneficiaries including Reliance, Ola Electric, and Rajesh Exports), and now the EU NZIA collectively represent over US$500 billion in government subsidies and incentives for local clean energy manufacturing. The net effect is a fragmentation of the global BESS supply chain: instead of a single, China-dominated supply chain serving the world market, the industry is evolving toward three regional supply chains — China/Asia-Pacific, North America, and Europe — each with its own manufacturing base, certification standards, and technology preferences.
This fragmentation has two opposing effects on BESS costs. On one hand, the loss of economies of scale — a single global factory producing 10 GWh/year of PCS has lower unit costs than three regional factories each producing 3 GWh/year — is likely to increase PCS costs by 10-20% globally. On the other hand, regional manufacturing reduces logistics costs (ocean freight from Shanghai to Rotterdam costs approximately US$3-5/kW for PCS, or 5-10% of the product cost), eliminates import duties (the EU currently imposes 0% MFN duty on BESS inverters, but this could change), and reduces supply chain risk (the 2021 Suez Canal blockage and 2024 Red Sea shipping disruptions demonstrated the vulnerability of long-distance supply chains). The net impact on total BESS system cost is likely neutral to slightly positive (2-5% increase) — significant, but not project-killing.
Future Outlook
Looking ahead to 2027-2030, three developments will determine whether the EU's inverter localization succeeds or becomes another protectionist dead end. First, the European Battery Alliance (EBA) 2.0: following Northvolt's bankruptcy, the European Commission is expected to announce a "EBA 2.0" strategy in early 2027, focused less on vertically integrated cell manufacturing (the Northvolt model, which proved too capital-intensive) and more on system integration, power electronics, and software — precisely the segments that Bersano's warning highlights. If EBA 2.0 includes targeted subsidies for inverter/PCS manufacturing (similar to the US 48C Advanced Energy Project Credit, which provides up to 30% investment tax credit for qualifying manufacturing facilities), it could accelerate the build-out of EU inverter capacity and close the price gap with Chinese suppliers.
Second, the WTO compatibility question. China has already challenged the EU's EV countervailing duties at the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the EU's subsidy calculation methodology violates WTO rules. If the WTO dispute panel rules in China's favor — a plausible outcome, given that the WTO has historically been skeptical of trade remedies based on non-market economy methodologies — it could limit the EU's ability to extend trade measures to BESS inverters. Conversely, if the panel upholds the EU's approach, it would provide a legal template for BESS-specific trade measures. The panel ruling is expected in mid-to-late 2027.
Third, the technology trajectory. If SiC-based inverters — which offer 1-2% higher efficiency than IGBT-based inverters, reduced cooling requirements, and smaller footprint — become the dominant technology for utility-scale BESS by 2028-2030, the EU's position strengthens further. Europe (STMicroelectronics) and the US (Wolfspeed) lead in SiC technology, while China's SiC industry is still in catch-up mode. SiC-based PCS manufactured in Europe could be genuinely competitive with IGBT-based PCS manufactured in China on a performance-adjusted basis, even without trade protection — meaning the EU's inverter localization policy could evolve from a protectionist measure into a genuine competitive advantage. For those tracking TUV CE IEC certified inverter availability in the European market, the message is clear: plan for a future where EU-certified, EU-manufactured inverters are the default — not the premium option — for BESS projects connected to European grids.
